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Legal education in the United States has been controversial in the last few years 
due to its cost, decreasing enrollments, and doubts about its practical value. Until 
the mid-nineteenth century legal training was essentially technical in nature. At 
that time many lawyers—like Abraham Lincoln—could afford to study the law by 
themselves without even attending law school and then, by passing the bar exam, 
were admitted in the legal profession. 
Things started to change after the American Civil War. In 1870, 
Christopher Langdell, a practicing lawyer, was named dean of the Harvard Law 
School and during his twenty-five years at the helm of that school he changed the 
curricular structure, reshaping legal education to this day. Langdell introduced the 
“case method” aimed at improving the critical thinking of students into more and 
more theoretical circumstances while starting to ignore the particulars of the 
practice. What this meant was that legal studies began to look more academic with 
a premium on scholarship rather than practical skills. In other words, law schools 
started to look more like other university studies—particularly in the humanities 
fields—than a vocational school. Even physically, the teaching of the law, which 
used to take place in rented rooms away from the main campus of the university, 
was now welcomed in better buildings on campus whose construction was 
routinely funded by their alumni. 
Since then, teaching in law schools has looked like the image popularized 
by the actor John Houseman in his role of Professor Kingsfield in The Paper 
Chase movie and subsequent TV series when applying “the Socratic method” in 
the classroom. Students started to be called in the cold and were expected to 
answer questions about cases from the casebook for each subject. 
Despite calls from many quarters in recent years to change the way the law 
is taught at the university level, we have not seen much of a transformation. On 
one hand you have clients complaining that they have to pay high fees (usually 
several hundreds of dollars per hour) to lawyers who lack practical experience 
while they are being trained by their law firms or elsewhere on practical skills. On 
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the other hand, you have law schools arguing that the law has so many different 
specialties that if you were to provide practical training in each one of them that 
would be impossible to complete in the three years you are supposed to spend at 
law school.  This is an interesting argument because another professional school—
medicine—does require years of hand-on experience before doctors are allowed to 
practice on their own. 
Part of the problem is that in the race for prestige, which is closely tied to 
admission of top students while enhancing attractiveness to potential donors, law 
schools seem to be more interested in recruiting legal scholars renowned for their 
research than people with practical experience as professors. A 2010 study 
authored by Brent E. Newton in the South Carolina Law Review showed that since 
the year 2000 faculty hired at top-tier law schools had only one year of legal 
experience on average with nearly half of them never having practiced law.  
Further, according to an article published in the New York Times, “it is widely 
believed that after lawyers have spent more than eight or nine years practicing, 
their chances of getting a tenure-track job at law school start to dwindle” which 
additionally shows disdain towards practical experience in law schools.1 
Attempts to change the approach of how to teach law have found 
mediocre success, which is usually tied to the persistent fear tenure-track faculty 
feel towards change. One of the most important innovations has been to increase 
the emphasis on opportunities for students to practice in legal clinics, designed to 
help people with modest or no resources get legal counseling for free while for 
students get some practical experience under faculty supervision. Good examples 
of these are the CUNY School of Law in Queens, New York, and Washington 
University’s Law School in St. Louis. Yet, according to the Center for the Study of 
Applied Legal Education, the percentage of law schools requiring this practical 
training is in the single digits. 
Despite these obvious shortcomings, law schools keep emphasizing 
scholarly work over practical experience. The highest accolade a law student can 
obtain—besides top grades—is to make it into the law reviews of their institutions. 
Law reviews are scholarly journals that focus on legal issues and are published by 
an organization of students at a law school or a bar association. 
Currently there are more than six hundred law reviews in the United 
States generating over ten thousand articles per year. Although many of these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. David Segal, “What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering,” New York 
Times, November 19, 2011. 
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articles comply with the high standards of scholarship that you would find in 
other disciplines, their practical value is, for the most part, doubtful. A study 
published in 2011 in the Northwestern University Law Review showed that in the 
61 previous years the Supreme Court had used legal scholarship in only about 
one-third of its decisions. As Supreme Court Justice Stephen G. Breyer said in a 
2008 speech at New York University, “There is evidence that law review articles 
have left terra firma to soar into outer space.”2 
Given all this criticism about law school it is not surprising that we now 
see books making proposals of how to teach law. One of the first was Steven 
Harper’s 2013 The Lawyer Bubble: A Profession in Crisis. Now we find another 
one, this time by Richard Posner. He has been a judge in the U. S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (basically Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin) since 
1981 and is a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. He has a 
great reputation in legal circles because he is the most-cited legal scholar, is highly 
prolific (he publishes a book per year on average), is considered by many the 
greatest living judge, and is someone who writes all of his own judicial opinions. 
He pioneered economic analysis of the law in the 1970s but has written about 
every imaginable legal topic since then. 
In Divergent Paths,  Posner aims at reforming the gap between the 
practical and the scholarly in the teaching of the law. His preoccupation is how we 
can provide a legal education that is less theory-driven and more relevant to the 
current and future demands of judging and lawyering in general, particularly at 
the federal level. The text of the book can be a dense one for those without a legal 
background, but still many of the messages regarding reforming law schools are 
clear and sound. 
 The book is divided into an introduction and two parts: 1) problems of 
the modern federal judiciary and 2) the academy to the rescue? Each of these parts 
are subdivided into three chapters each, for six total chapters: 1) structural 
deformation, 2) process deficiencies, 3) management deficiencies, 4) the 
contribution of scholarship, 5) the law school curriculum and 6) continuing 
judiciary education. The book ends with an epilogue and has a subject index. 
To summarize all of the book in this article would be beyond the scope of 
this review since Posner refers to 55 problems (some of them very complex) and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2. Stephen G. Breyer, “Response of Justice Stephen G. Breyer,” New York 
University Annual Survey of American Law 64 (2008): 33. It is interesting to note that four 
of the current justices of the U. S. Supreme Court were law professors at some point in 
their careers: Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Kennedy. 
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48 proposed solutions.  Therefore, let me concentrate on the solutions he 
proposes for the problems highlighted in the introduction of this review regarding 
law schools. Posner believes that there should be major changes in the curriculum. 
He deems that more constitutional law should be taught in the first year of law 
school to provide a better context and that more interdisciplinary approaches are 
needed in order to deal with today’s real legal problems. He is also critical of the 
“continued emphasis in legal-writing courses on the Bluebook” (a systematic 
method by which members of the legal profession communicate important 
information to one another about the sources and legal authorities upon which 
they rely in their work). He believes in focusing more on teaching writing in a way 
that will allow lawyers to communicate better not only with their peers but also 
with the general public. This is not surprising because as we are all witnessing in 
academia, regardless of the field, students who come to college are less and less 
capable of constructing intelligible sentences. To pretend that they can do that 
when immersing themselves into obscure legal prose is becoming more and more 
challenging. He recommends that academics should write shorter and simpler 
articles. Posner also reminds us—and with good reason—that the vast majority of 
law students do not get into law schools to the become scholars but to practice the 
law.  
He also points out that there are political predispositions in many judicial 
decisions and that most law professors abstain from criticizing judges for 
whatever perceived or real political biases. He thinks that is a mistake and that the 
professors should concentrate on analyzing and criticizing the decisions, not the 
personalities. He insists that both faculty and students should conduct 
scientifically grounded research into the role of ideology and other factors in 
judging.  He also says that most casebooks—the main printed sources used by law 
students—also fail in that regard. Given that the casebooks are very expensive 
(about $200 on average) he proposes that law professors just hand out the list of 
cases and the questions they should be considering; after all, the totality of those 
cases are available electronically through the LexisNexis database.  No wonder he 
calls casebooks “an anachronism.” 
Another criticism he has is the obsession with the superficiality of teaching 
based on the reliance on precedents because—he affirms—many of those citations 
lack a comprehensive analysis of all of the facts, reason by which many lawyers 
pick and choose what they think is going to be most convenient for their 
arguments regardless of all the facts of the case. 
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He also proposes that, like many other professions, there should be more 
required training by lawyers after they graduate. His reasoning is very simple: law 
is becoming more and more complex and new approaches—even unconventional 
ones—are needed to advance certain cases and you can only learn that on your 
own via either online and/or one-on-one training camps. 
Another interesting—and somewhat surprising—recommendation he 
makes is to teach less on relying on legal analysis (the kind of multifactor tests that 
lists considerations for the judge to weigh and compare) and develop more insight 
into how to decide cases. He does not believe in deciding cases in a manner that 
may look like following a cookbook but to actually develop the ability to come up 
with better discernment on cases given that they are becoming more complex and 
interdisciplinary in nature. He does believe that lawyers that aspire to be part of a 
court procedure in any fashion should be trained to have a solid preparation in 
doctrinal work by examining specific rules because students must understand that 
legal doctrine does not decide the most unusual (and interesting) cases. 
This last point is interesting and he uses it to support his conviction that 
panel courts, like the supreme courts at either state or federal levels, should be 
composed by judges who have had different experiences before becoming a 
justice, especially if those experiences were in different branches of government. 
He agrees that law schools should be emphasizing legal analyses of specific 
rules rather than the exploration of foundational questions typical of theoretical 
scholarship. He champions the idea of more clinical experience under the 
supervision of faculty. 
Posner’s book is, therefore, a valuable contribution to the discussion of the 
reforms that law schools need. The problem is that even if the majority in the legal 
profession agree about what needs to be done, they will encounter what in 
academia is called “passive resistance” to change that can be an insurmountable 
barrier. Unless, of course, law firms and their clients as well as law students start 
to demand changes. After all, students are paying top money for tuition, most of 
which ends up supporting faculty scholarship. The whole system should also place 
less emphasis on the name of the graduating institution while seeking to reduce 
the cost of legal education. After all, after graduating from law school those 
lawyers who have spent countless hours learning a lot of theories and facts will 
find them to be of little—if any— use in their day-to-day practice. 
 
